Abstract

The concept of fuxing, or national renaissance, lies at the heart of Xi Jinping’s governance vision. While originally framed as a domestic project of rejuvenation, fuxing has been reframed into an exportable ideology: a model of state-led development, stability, and sovereignty. This article examines how China projects fuxing globally through cultural diplomacy, infrastructure initiatives, and governance discourse, positioning authoritarian stability as an alternative to liberal democracy. It analyzes the strategic appeal, instruments of export, contradictions, and long-term implications of this ideological projection.

I. Introduction

Since the beginning of Xi Jinping’s tenure in 2012, Chinese political discourse has been anchored in the concept of the Chinese Dream (Zhongguo Meng), which Xi defined as the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This vision is closely tied to fuxing, meaning renaissance or rejuvenation, which encapsulates both a historical narrative of overcoming the “century of humiliation” and a forward-looking project of national greatness.

Initially, fuxing was designed as a domestic doctrine to strengthen the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It reassured citizens that the Party was steering China toward prosperity, stability, and international respect. Yet as China’s global profile expanded—through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), growing foreign investments, and more assertive diplomacy—fuxing began to transcend national boundaries.

China’s leadership has increasingly promoted its governance model abroad: a system that prioritizes development, political stability, and sovereignty over pluralism or electoral democracy. For countries disillusioned with Western liberalism or struggling with governance challenges, this narrative offers an alternative. The export of fuxing thus represents not just a domestic legitimacy project but a global strategy aimed at shaping international norms.

This article explores how fuxing has been transformed into a framework of ideological export. It begins by unpacking the doctrinal roots of the concept, then examines the instruments of exportation—economic, cultural, digital, and normative—before analyzing the global appeal of China’s governance model. Finally, it addresses the contradictions and limits of this project, and its potential future trajectory.

II. Ideological Roots of Fuxing

The concept of fuxing is not an invention of Xi Jinping. It has deep roots in Chinese intellectual and political history, often linked to narratives of decline and resurgence. During the late Qing and Republican periods, reformers and revolutionaries spoke of national “renewal” as a way to restore sovereignty and dignity in the face of imperial encroachment.

Xi’s articulation of fuxing builds directly on this legacy. He has repeatedly emphasized that the CCP’s mission is to deliver the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” linking China’s modern trajectory to a teleological path of recovery from past humiliation. In this sense, fuxing is both a historical project (rectifying injustice) and a political program (achieving prosperity and strength).

Domestically, fuxing provides the CCP with a unifying vision that fuses nationalism with development. It frames economic growth as proof of Party competence, while military modernization and social stability demonstrate resilience against internal and external threats.

But as Xi himself has noted, the Chinese Dream cannot be realized in isolation. A stable external environment and recognition of China’s status are prerequisites for rejuvenation. This outward extension of fuxing laid the groundwork for its transformation into a doctrine of foreign policy and governance export.

III. Mechanisms of Ideological Export

China’s ideological export does not operate through formalized doctrines akin to the Soviet Union’s Marxist-Leninist model. Instead, it is more diffuse, pragmatic, and tied to instruments of power projection. Several mechanisms stand out.

1. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Launched in 2013, the BRI is the most visible manifestation of China’s external vision. While primarily framed as an infrastructure and connectivity program, it carries ideological undertones. By promoting development-first cooperation, Beijing implicitly advances the idea that economic modernization can precede—or even replace—political liberalization.

BRI projects often come with accompanying narratives of “win-win cooperation” and “mutual development.” This language resonates with governments that see Western aid as conditional or intrusive. By offering roads, railways, ports, and digital infrastructure without overt demands for democratic reforms, China presents itself as a partner that respects sovereignty while delivering tangible progress.

2. Cultural Diplomacy

Through Confucius Institutes, cultural centers, academic partnerships, and state-run media like CGTN and Xinhua, China promotes narratives of harmonious development and “telling China’s story well.” Cultural diplomacy connects fuxing to civilizational pride, positioning China not only as an economic giant but also as a cultural model.

This strategy blends soft power with ideological projection. By emphasizing Confucian values—order, hierarchy, harmony—Beijing aligns cultural revival with governance legitimacy, suggesting that China’s political system is rooted in deep civilizational traditions rather than arbitrary authoritarianism.

3. Digital Authoritarianism

China has become a global leader in exporting surveillance and digital governance technologies. Companies like Huawei, Hikvision, and ZTE supply infrastructure that enables governments to monitor populations and control information.

This export is accompanied by normative advocacy: the idea of “cyber-sovereignty,” where each state controls its digital space without external interference. For regimes facing internal dissent or instability, this model offers both technological tools and ideological justification.

4. Normative Vocabulary

China’s diplomacy consistently emphasizes principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and mutual respect. These terms serve as counter-norms to Western liberal discourse centered on democracy and human rights.

By embedding these concepts in UN resolutions, multilateral forums, and bilateral agreements, China gradually normalizes an alternative governance vocabulary. The narrative is simple but powerful: every state has the right to choose its path, and development should not be subordinated to Western political conditionality.

IV. Authoritarian Governance as a Global Alternative

China does not explicitly declare its system superior to liberal democracy. Instead, it frames its governance as “different but effective.” The implicit argument is twofold:

1. Performance Legitimacy: The CCP delivers stability, economic growth, and poverty alleviation.
2. Procedural Critique: Western democracies are plagued by polarization, gridlock, and declining effectiveness.

This contrast has global resonance. For many developing countries, China’s trajectory—rapid growth without democratization—offers a template. It suggests that authoritarianism can coexist with modernization, and even outperform democracy in delivering tangible results.

Beijing further reinforces this appeal by positioning itself as a champion of multipolarity. By rejecting the universality of liberal values, China appeals to governments seeking autonomy from Western prescriptions. Fuxing thus becomes more than national rejuvenation: it embodies an alternative vision of governance in a multipolar world.

V. Contradictions and Limits

Despite its appeal, China’s ideological export faces significant challenges.

• Accusations of Neo-colonialism: In Africa and parts of Asia, BRI projects have triggered debt concerns and resentment, undermining the narrative of “mutual benefit.”
• Local Resistance: While elites may welcome Chinese investment, societies often remain skeptical of authoritarian models, preferring pluralism even if imperfect.
• Geopolitical Pushback: The United States, the European Union, Japan, and India actively promote counter-narratives—highlighting transparency, accountability, and democratic resilience.
• Internal Contradictions: China’s rhetoric of sovereignty sometimes clashes with coercive behavior, such as military pressure in the South China Sea or economic retaliation against states critical of Beijing.

These contradictions limit the universality of fuxing as an ideological export. It remains more appealing to governments than to societies, more pragmatic than inspirational.

VI. Future Outlook

The future of fuxing as a global ideology depends on several factors.

• Sustainability: Can China deliver on its promises without overextending economically or politically? Failed projects or excessive debt could tarnish its image.
• Adaptation: To gain broader legitimacy, China may need to soften the authoritarian edge of its model, presenting it more as “developmental pragmatism” than as a rigid system.
• Global Contestation: As ideological competition intensifies, the battle will not be fought only on material grounds but also on narratives of governance, legitimacy, and sovereignty.

Ultimately, fuxing is not designed to replace liberal democracy everywhere but to offer an alternative where conditions allow. Its success will hinge on whether it can sustain credibility while resisting the backlash generated by its contradictions.

VII. Conclusion

China’s fuxing began as a domestic rallying call, promising national rejuvenation under CCP leadership. Today, it has evolved into a doctrine of global projection—an ideological export that combines development-first governance, respect for sovereignty, and authoritarian stability. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, cultural diplomacy, digital technologies, and normative advocacy, Beijing positions its system as a viable alternative to liberal democracy.

Yet the project remains fragile. Its appeal is strongest among political elites but weaker among societies. Its credibility is threatened by debt concerns, coercive practices, and growing geopolitical rivalry. Still, fuxing marks a significant transformation in China’s role: from a state once wary of exporting ideology to a power that actively seeks to shape global norms.

The contest between governance models—liberal democracy versus authoritarian developmentalism—will define the ideological dimension of world politics in the coming decades. Whether fuxing emerges as a durable paradigm or fades under the weight of contradictions will be one of the central questions of international order in the 21st century.

References

• Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, Vol. I–III, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014–2020.
• Zheng Wang, The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2013.
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation,” 21 May 2014.
• Nadège Rolland, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Motives, Scope, and Challenges, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017.
• Bruno Maçães, Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order, London: Hurst, 2018.
• Christopher Walker & Jessica Ludwig, Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence, National Endowment for Democracy, 2017.
• Steven Feldstein, The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance, Oxford University Press, 2021.
• Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford University Press, 2009.